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NOTES
Removing the Vestiges of Discrimination:
Criminal Disenfranchisement Laws
and Strategies for Challenging Them
Carl N. Frazier'
I. INTRODUCTION
N a democratic republic, perhaps no right is more fundamental than
the right to freely cast a ballot.' Justice Black observed, "[n]o right is
more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the election
of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live.
Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is under-
mined."' The fact is, however, that an estimated 5.3 million otherwise vot-
ing-eligible Americans are prohibited from exercising this most basic right.4
These disenfranchised American citizens are convicted felons.'
At the time of its completion in 1787, the United States Constitution
mentioned the right to vote only in passing and appeared to leave the quali-
I J.D. expected, 2007, University of Kentucky College of Law; B.A. 2004, Transylvania
University. The author wishes to express gratitude to Jeff for his affection, encouragement,
and patience, all of which have been especially invaluable during the demands of law school.
The author also wishes to thank the editors and staff of the Kentucky Law Journal, whose
dedication to excellence is apparent and appreciated. The Note won first place in the 2006
Kentucky Bar Association student writing competition, and it is published here with permis-
sion of the KBA.
2 See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 57 (James Madison) ("Who are to be the electors
of the federal representatives? Not the rich, more than the poor; not the learned, more than
the ignorant; not the haughty heirs of distinguished names, more than the humble sons of
obscurity and unpropitious fortune. The electors are to be the great body of the people of the
United States. They are to be the same who exercise the right in every State of electing the
corresponding branch of the legislature of the State.").
3 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964).
4 THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES
I (zoo6), http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/Io46.pdf [hereinafter THE SENTENCING
PROJECT].
5 This also includes some convicted misdemeanants. See ALEC EWALD, THE SENTENCING
PROJECT, A "CRAZY QUILT" OF TINY PIECES: STATE AND LOCAL ADMINISTRATION OF AMERICAN
CRIMINAL DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS 6 (2005), http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/crazy-
quilt.pdf.
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fication of voters as an issue for the states to decide.6 In most states, the right
to vote was originally limited to "property-owning, taxpaying white males
over the age of twenty-one."7 Gradually, the right to vote was expanded to
previously disenfranchised classes. A series of constitutional amendments
enfranchised African Americans in 1870,8 women in 1920,9 and all citizens
over the age of eighteen in 1971.10 Moreover, other constitutional amend-
ments provided for the direct election of senators in 1913" and abolished
the poll tax in 1964.12 The U.S. Supreme Court weighed in with Reynolds
v. Sims and Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, which respectively
held that all voters must have an equal opportunity to participate in state
elections,13 and that the state's discretion in limiting the right to vote is
narrow.14 Finally, Congress passed the landmark Voting Rights Act in 1965,
which prohibits states from diluting minority voting power and charges the
U.S. Department of Justice with monitoring some states' voting practices. 5
Today, suffrage in statewide and federal elections is universal for citizens
eighteen and older, with one important caveat: in most states, current and
former criminals cannot vote.' 6 As the political and judicial institutions of
both federal and state governments have generally sought to expand the
franchise to previously disenfranchised classes, no such progress has been
6 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. I("[Alnd the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications
requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.").
7 Pamela S. Karlan, Ballots and Bullets: The Exceptional History ofthe Right to Vote, 71 U. CIN.
L. REV. 1345, 1345 (2003).
8 U.S. CONsT. amend. XV, § I ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude.").
9 U.S. CONsT. amend. XIX ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.").
10 U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § I ("The right of citizens of the United States, who are
eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or
by any State on account of age.").
11 U.S. CONsT. amend. XVII ("The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two
Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof .... ").
12 U.S. CONsT. amend. XXIV, § I ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote in
any primary or other election for President or Vice President, for electors for President or Vice
President, or for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or any State by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax.").
13 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554 (1964) ("Undeniably the Constitution of the
United States protects the right of all qualified citizens to vote, in state as well as in federal
elections.").
14 Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663,668 (1966) ("But we must remember
that the interest of the State, when it comes to voting, is limited to the power to fix qualifi-
cations. Wealth, like race, creed, or color, is not germane to one's ability to participate intel-
ligently in the electoral process.").
15 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 (2000). The Voting Rights Act has been expanded and/or
reauthorized in 1970, 1975, 1982, and 2oo6.
16 THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 4.
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made with respect to criminals. 7 Part II of this Note will examine the sta-
tus of criminal disenfranchisement laws1" throughout the states.' 9 Part III
will discuss the various types of legal arguments and political mechanisms
used to challenge those laws."0 Finally, Part IV will offer suggestions as to
the most effective ways in which barriers to the franchise for criminals can
be overcome.2'
II. THE LAY OF THE LAND
A. The Historical Context and Policy Considerations
The roots of the American criminal disenfranchisement movement can be
directly traced to the concept of "civil death" at British common law."2 Un-
der a process known as "attainder," a variety of collateral civil disabilities
were attached to a felony conviction, such as the loss of the right to pass and
inherit property and the right to vote. 3 When large portions of the English
common law took hold in the newly independent American colonies, the
concept of total civil death was generally rejected, but provisions barring
criminals from voting remained. 4 Around 1850, nineteen of the thirty-four
existing states had some type of law preventing criminals from voting. 5
The ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment in 1870 brought voting
rights to African Americans and other individuals who had previously toiled
under state statutes prohibiting members of certain racial groups from vot-
ing. Shortly thereafter, racist Southern lawmakers-fearful of this new in-
flux of voters-assembled state constitutional conventions to design and
17 See Note, The Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons: Citizenship, Criminality, and "The Purity of
the Ballot Box", 102 HARv. L. REV. 1300, 1300 (1989) [hereinafter Note].
18 The literature generally uses the phrase "felon disenfranchisement statute." See, e.g.,
Martine J. Price, Note, Addressing Ex-Felon Disenfranchisement: Legislation vs. Litigation, I I J.L. &
PoI'Y 369 (zooz). However, some states prohibit misdemeanants from voting, and other states
merely disenfranchise felons while they are serving their sentences. See EWALD, supra note 5.
In the interest of good semantics and to be as inclusive as possible, this note will utilize the
phrase "criminal disenfranchisement laws."
19 See infra notes 22-63 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 64-I8O and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 181-82 and accompanying text.
22 See Special Project, The Collateral Consequences of a Criminal Conviction, 23 VAND. L. REV.
929,942-43 (1970)-
23 See id. at 943.
24 JAMIE FELLNER & MARK MAUER, LOSING THE VOTE: T'IE IMPACT OF FELONY
DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (1998), http://www.sentencingproject.
org/pdfs/9o8o.pdf.
25 Howard Itzkowitz & Lauren Oldak, Note, Restoring the Ex-Offender's Right to Vote:
Background and Developments, iI Am. CRIM. L. REV. 721, 725 (1973) (quoting K. PORTER, A
HISTORY OF SUFFRAGE IN THE UNITED STATES 148 (1918)).
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codify into law new prohibitions on voting.16 These conventions resulted
in mechanisms such as the poll tax, literacy tests, and grandfather clauses,
which did not facially violate the Fifteenth Amendment. 7 A more subtly
racist product of these conventions was the criminal disenfranchisement
statute whose intent was clear: to suppress African American voters.18 After
1890, Southern states actually changed their criminal disenfranchisement
statutes to target crimes for which African Americans were prosecuted
most often. 9 Mississippi's plan became a model followed by several other
Southern states. ° The results of these new voting restrictions were strik-
ing. In Louisiana, African Americans made up forty-four percent of regis-
tered voters following the Civil War but less than one percent in 1920.31 In
Mississippi, nearly seventy percent of African Americans were registered to
vote in 1867, but less than six percent were in 1892.32 Of the voting prohi-
bitions introduced by these Southern conventions during Reconstruction,
only criminal disenfranchisement remains.
Today, mainstream proponents of criminal disenfranchisement regimes
do not point to minority vote dilution as a policy justification for these stat-
utes' existence, for to rely on such a rationale would clearly run afoul of
the Fourteenth Amendment.3 3 Instead, some scholars point to "a fear that
ex-convicts might use their votes to alter the content or administration of
the criminal law' ' and "a belief that the disqualification of former felons
is necessary to guard against vote fraud and related election offenses
35
as justification for criminal disenfranchisement. The first argument seems
weak at best, as the content of one's vote or her reasons for choosing to
cast a ballot are immaterial to the question of whether she should have
26 C. VANN WOODWARD, ORIGINS OF THE NEW SOUTH: 1877-I913, at 321 (1951).
27 Andrew L. Shapiro, Challenging Criminal Disenfranchisement Under the Voting Rights Act: A
New Strategy, 103 YALE L.J. 537, 537-38 (1993).
28 See id. at 539-40.
29 See WOODWARD, supra note 26, at 330-31. The Mississippi Supreme Court noted that
"[Oiffenses to which its [the state's] weaker members [African Americans] were prone..."
included "bribery, burglary, theft, arson, obtaining money or goods under false pretenses, per-
jury, forgery, embezzlement or bigamy," which were the precise crimes for which individuals
in that state were disenfranchised. Ratliff v. Beale, 20 So. 865, 867-68 (Miss. 1896).
30 See WOODWARD, supra note 26, at 321-22.
31 Karen McGill Arrington, The Struggle to Gain the Right to Vote: 1787-1965, in VOTING
RIGHTS IN AMERICA 25, 30 (Karen M. Arrington & William L. Taylor eds., 1992).
32 Id.
33 It is settled that proof of a discriminatory purpose in enacting a voting procedure vio-
lates the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 67-68 (i98o), super-
sededby statute, Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 13 1. The
statute superseded Bolden on its interpretation of the Voting Rights Act; the court's discussion
of the Fourteenth Amendment is still valid.
34 Note, supra note 17, at 1302-03 (discussing Dillenburg v. Kramer, 469 Ed 1222 (9th
Cir. 1972)).
35 Id.
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the right to vote in the first place.3 6 If the premise of the second argument
is true-that convicted criminals are more likely to commit vote fraud-a
blanket prohibition on voting for all criminals seems to over-address the
problem, especially in light of more specific statutes intended to preserve
the sanctity of the electoral process.37
Given the weakness of these "regulatory" policy justifications, some
scholars have evaluated criminal disenfranchisement regimes as a form of
punishment.38 Using a retributive punishment argument, some point out
that criminals have broken the social contract and are therefore morally un-
suitable to exercise the franchise.39 Opponents argue that this justification
misconstrues the nature and purpose of social contract theory and ignores
scholarship demonstrating that criminals can be-and often are-rehabili-
tated as contributing members of society.4" A retributive justification often
proffered by the laity-the straight-forward "if-you-don't-want-the-time-
don't-do-the-crime" argument-is unfulfilling, in that it does not address
the underlying purpose of imposing such a punishment in the first place.4
There may also be a deterrence justification for criminal disenfranchise-
ment statutes-namely, that these statutes would deter some individuals
from committing crimes for fear of losing their voting rights. Some scholars
have argued that such a justification is weak, positing that the promise of
disenfranchisement likely has little effect on a criminal's mind that is al-
ready undeterred by a lengthy prison sentence.42 While the intent of this
Note is not to be a treatise on the policy justifications of criminal disenfran-
chisement, it is important to observe that there are non-racist arguments for
their perpetuation.
B. Current Status of Criminal Disenfranchisement Laws
The most consistent theme among the various state approaches to crimi-
nal disenfranchisement is that there is no consistency. A U.S. Department
of Justice official described the phenomenon as a "national crazy-quilt of
36 See generally Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965) (holding that voter disenfranchise-
ment based on viewpoint is unconstitutional).
37 See Note, supra note 17, at 1302. Consider Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 119.165, .205 (West
2005), prohibiting voter impersonation in the former and vote buying in the latter.
38 See Pamela S. Karlan, Convictions and Doubts: Retribution, Representation, and the Debate
Over Felon Disenfranchisement, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1147, 1150 (2004).
39 See Note, supra note 17, at 1304.
40 See generally id. at 1304-09.
41 The Eighth Amendment requires punishment be related to a legitimate purpose. See
generally Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 303-04 (1972) ("[Olur laws distribute punishments
according to the gravity of crimes ....").
42 See Alec C. Ewald, "Civil Death ": The Ideological Paradox of Criminal Disenfranchisement
Law in the United States, 2002 Wis. L. REV. 1045, 1105-06 (2002).
2006-20071
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disqualifications and restoration procedures."43 With respect to currently
incarcerated individuals, all states and the District of Columbia, with the
exception of Maine and Vermont, prohibit felony inmates from voting.4
Thirty states deny the franchise to felons on probation, and an additional
five prohibit voting by parolee felons. 45 Three states-Florida, Kentucky,
and Virginia-permanently bar all convicted felons from voting.46 In addi-
tion, nine other states place some voting restrictions on felons who have
completed their sentences, either as a disability for a set number of years or
permanent disenfranchisement only for certain felony offenses.
47
Disqualification from voting is not always limited to felony convictions.
At least four states-Colorado,4 Illinois, 49 Michigan,"0 and South Caro-
linalt-prohibit any incarcerated individual from voting. Maryland disen-
43 EWALD, supra note 5, at I (citing SusAN M. KUZMA, OFFICE OF THE PARDON ATTORNEY,
CIVIL DISABILITIES OF CONVICTED FELONS: A STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY i (1996)).
44 See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 4, at 3.
45 See id. The states that disenfranchise felons on probation include: Alabama, Alaska,
Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico,
North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, West
Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. These thirty states plus California, Colorado, Connecticut,
New York, and South Dakota disenfranchise parolee felons.
46 See id. An additional state, Iowa, also has a constitutional provision that permanently
bars those convicted of "infamous crimes" from voting unless the governor has restored their
civil rights. IOWA CONST. art. II, § 5; id. art. IV, § I6. On July 4, 2005, Governor Tom Vilsack
issued Executive Order 42, which implements a scheme to automatically restore the vot-
ing rights of felons who have completed their sentences. Iowa Exec. Order No. 42 (July 4,
zoo5). As a practical matter pursuant to Governor Vilsack's policy, Iowa felons' voting rights
are restored upon completion of their sentence, yet the constitutional provision remains on
the books.
47 See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 4, at 3. These states include: Alabama,
Arizona, Delaware, Maryland, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, Tennessee, and Wyoming.
48 See COLO. CONST. art. VII, § so ("No person while confined in any public prison shall
be entitled to vote .... ).
49 See 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-5 (2005) ("No person who has been legally convicted, in
this or another State or in any federal court, of any crime, and is serving a sentence of confine-
ment in any penal institution, or who has been convicted under any section of this Act and is
serving a sentence of confinement in any penal institution, shall vote, offer to vote, attempt to
vote or be permitted to vote at any election until his release from confinement .... ).
50 See MICH. CONST. art. II, § 1 ("Every citizen of the United States who has attained the
age of 21 years, who has resided in this state six months, and who meets the requirements
of local residence provided by law, shall be an elector and qualified to vote in any election
except as otherwise provided in this constitution. The legislature shall define residence for
voting purposes."); id. § 2 ("The legislature may by law exclude persons from voting because
of mental incompetence or commitment to a jail or penal institution."); MICH. COMP. LAWS §
168. 10 (2005) ("The term 'qualified elector', as used in this act, shall be construed to mean any
person who possesses the qualifications of an elector as prescribed in section I of article 2 of
the state constitution and who has resided in the city or township 30 days.").
51 See S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-5-I 2o(b)(2) (2005) ("A person is disqualified from being regis-
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franchises all individuals incarcerated for an "infamous crime.""2 In each of
these states, there is evidence to suggest that misdemeanants may actually,
as a practical and extra-legal matter, be permitted to vote, yet the applica-
tion of this principle is inconsistent and open to the judgment of the gov-
ernment official entrusted with making such a decision.
3
C. The Impact
Criminal disenfranchisement statutes have a marked effect on the landscape
of the American electorate. The most recent estimates place the number of
American citizens who are ineligible to cast a vote due to incarceration or a
criminal conviction at 5.3 million.5 4 Moreover, criminal disenfranchisement
regimes have a disproportionate effect on racial minorities. For example,
thirteen percent of all African American men are disenfranchised,55 which
is seven times the national average for all persons barred from voting due to
a criminal conviction. 6 In 1998, Florida and Alabama's criminal disenfran-
chisement laws barred thirty-one percent of African American men from
voting. 7 A voting rights advocacy group predicts that, given the current ex-
plosion in prison populations, the number of African American men barred
from voting because of a criminal conviction may reach an astonishing
thirty-three percent within the next generation.58 While some would argue
that these figures are merely indicative of a larger issue of prosecutorial bias
towards racial minorities,5 9 the fact that criminal disenfranchisement laws
prohibit a significant number of individuals from voting is inescapable.
Aside from rendering fewer individuals in the electorate, criminal dis-
enfranchisement laws have a number of secondary effects. First, the census
counts inmates as living where they are incarcerated, which produces inap-
propriately sized districts in areas where there is a high prison population.
6
1
tered or voting if he: ... (2) is serving a term of imprisonment resulting from a conviction of
a crime....").
52 See MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 3-102(b)(I) (West 2005). The Maryland State Board
of Elections interprets "infamous crime" to mean "any felony, treason, perjury, or any crime
involving an element of deceit, fraud, or corruption." Md. State Bd. of Elections, Restoration
of Voting Rights in Maryland, http://elections.state.md.us/voter-registration/restoration.html
(last visited Feb. 25, 2007). Conceivably, there are misdemeanors that meet such a definition.
53 See EWALD, supra note 5.
54 TIHE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 4.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 JAMIE FELLNER & MARK MAIJER, supra note 24, at 8.
58 THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 4. The predicted rate of disenfranchisement
rises to forty percent in states that bar all ex-offenders from voting. Id.
59 See generally Daniel S. Goldman, Note, The Modern-Day Literacy Test?: Felon
Disenfranchisement and Race Discrimination, 57 STAN. L. REv. 611, 628-32 (2004).
60 See Rosanna M. Taormina, Comment, Defying One-Person, One-Vote: Prisoners and the
2oo6-2oo7]
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Denying the franchise to inmates effectively renders the voters of these
districts more powerful than voters in other, less prisoner-populated dis-
tricts. 61 Second, the enfranchisement of criminals in some jurisdictions may
lead to significant changes in the outcome of elections. For example, Al
Gore lost the 2000 presidential election in Florida by 537 votes6 -an elec-
tion in which 525,000 non-incarcerated Floridians were prohibited from
voting because of a felony conviction. 63 Turnout of a mere fraction of those
disenfranchised individuals may have changed the outcome of the entire
2000 presidential election. Finally, in excluding a substantial number of
individuals from the political sphere, criminal disenfranchisement laws ar-
guably alter the content and character of the available viewpoints in any
given election.
III. STRATEGIES FOR ATTACKING
CRIMINAL DISENFRANCHISEMENT STATUTES
Challenges to the legality of criminal disenfranchisement statutes began
shortly after the disenfranchisement conventions of the post-Fifteenth
Amendment period and continued into the twenty-first century.64 Oppo-
nents have utilized various novel legal arguments, yet most attacks to crim-
inal disenfranchisement provisions are generally grounded in one or more
of the following theories: the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment,65 the Eighth Amendment,
66 the Voting Rights Act of 1965,67
and political pressure on legislative policymakers.68 This Note examines
each of these theories in turn.
"Usual Residence" Principle, 152 U. PA. L. REv. 431 , 445-49 (2003).
6I Id. at 448.
62 Div. of Elections, Fla. Dep't of State, Election Results, http://election.dos.state.
fl.us/elections/resultsarchive/index.asp (follow "2ooo General" hyperlink; then follow "U.S.
President" hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 25, 2007).
63 Brian Pinaire et al., Barred From the Vote: Public Attitudes Toward the Disenfranchisement
of Felons, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1519, 1520 (2003).
64 See, e.g., Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 2I3 (1898); Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405
E3d 1214 ( 1 th Cir. 2004) (en banc). The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the so-called Mississippi
Plan constitutional disenfranchisement provisions barring those who had been "convicted of
theft, arson, repe [sic], receiving money or goods under false pretenses, bigamy, [and] embez-
zlement" in 1898. Williams, 170 U.S. at 221, 225 (noting "[tihey [the state's criminal disenfran-
chisement provisions] do not on their face discriminate between the races, and it has not been
shown that their actual administration was evil, only that evil was possible under them.").
65 See infra notes 69-95 and accompanying text.
66 See infra notes 96-1 12 and accompanying text.
67 See infra notes 113-148 and accompanying text.
68 See infra notes 149-174 and accompanying text.
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A. Equal Protection
In 1974, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Richardson v. Ramirez, issued what many
consider its seminal opinion on the constitutionality of criminal disenfran-
chisement.69 In a suit brought by disenfranchised felons alleging a violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, the Court upheld
California's constitutional and statutory criminal disenfranchisement provi-
sions.70 It is well-established that statutes affecting a fundamental right,
such as voting, and those affecting a suspect class, such as racial groups, are
subjected to strict scrutiny by the Court.71 The Richardson plaintiffs argued
that California's disenfranchisement policy limited a fundamental right,
but the Court refused to apply strict scrutiny.72 The Court noted that strict
scrutiny is justified in voting rights cases only when the statute or policy in
question runs afoul of section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.73 Criminal
disenfranchisement statutes, the Court held, are specifically authorized by
section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment.74 Therefore, the Court reasoned,
an act specifically envisioned by section 2 could not run afoul of section 1.11
As Richardson instructs, once the fundamental rights inquiry is completed,
a state need only satisfy minimum rationality to meet the equal protection
threshold for criminal disenfranchisement laws.76 Subsequently, lower fed-
69 See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
70 Id. at 56.
71 See generally Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432-33 (1984) (holding that race is a
suspect classification and subjecting statutes drawing racial classifications to strict scrutiny);
Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 627-28 (1969) (holding that voting is a
fundamental right and subjecting statutes interfering with the franchise to strict scrutiny).
72 See Richardson, 418 U.S. at 55-56.
73 See id. at 54. Section i states in relevant part: "[Nior [shall any state] deny to any per-
son within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § i.
74 See Richardson, 418 U.S. at 42-43, 54-55. Section 2 states in relevant part:
But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors
for President and Vice-President of the United States, Representatives
in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the mem-
bers of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants
of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the propor-
tion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole
number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 2 (emphasis added).
75 See Richardson, 418 U.S. at 55.
76 Virtually any legitimate state interest (retribution for convicted felons, for example)
will satisfy minimum rationality. In Richardson, minimum rationality was met. See id. at 55-
56.
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eral courts followed Richardson in upholding criminal disenfranchisement
provisions against equal protection challenges.77
Although Richardson seemed to foreclose, for all practical purposes, the
possibility of a successful equal protection challenge to criminal disenfran-
chisement laws, the Supreme Court reopened the door in 1985 with its
decision in Hunter v. Underwood.78 In Hunter, a group of felons brought an
equal protection challenge to Alabama's constitutional provision providing
for felon disenfranchisement, which was ratified during the disenfranchise-
ment convention movement at the dawn of the twentieth century.79 The
plaintiffs in Hunter presented the argument not addressed by Richardson-
namely, that the provision was created with racially discriminatory intent.80
The Hunter Court held that notwithstanding the Fourteenth Amendment
section 2 authority to disenfranchise criminals, such a provision might still
violate equal protection if (1) it was adopted with racially discriminatory
intent and (2) it has a disproportionate impact on a protected class.81 The
Court considered voluminous historical records showing that the delegates
to the Alabama constitutional convention who adopted the disenfranchise-
ment provision openly declared their intention to prevent African Ameri-
cans from exercising the franchise. 8 Additionally, the Court reviewed
statistical evidence demonstrating the disparate impact criminal disenfran-
chisement has on African Americans in Alabama.s3 Having satisfied both
the intent and impact prongs, the Hunter Court invalidated the Alabama
criminal disenfranchisement provision.'
Although Hunter provided opponents of criminal disenfranchisement
with an equal protection avenue of attack, it has proven minimally fruitful
at best.85 In practice, lower federal courts appear unwilling to invalidate
77 See, e.g., Owens v. Barnes, 711 F2d 25 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 963 (1983);
Shepherd v. Trevino, 575 E2d I I TO (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979).
78 Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985).
79 Id. at 223-24.
8o Id. at 224.
81 See id. at 233.
82 The evidence included transcripts of the convention and historical monographs de-
tailing the disenfranchisement convention movement in the South. Id. at 228-31. The Court
concluded: "[W]e simply observe that its original enactment was motivated by a desire to
discriminate against blacks on account of race...." Id. at 233.
83 "In Jefferson and Montgomery Counties blacks are by even the most modest esti-
mates at least 1.7 times as likely as whites to suffer disfranchisement under section 182 for the
commission of nonprison offenses." Id. at 227 (quoting Underwood v. Hunter, 730 E2d 614,
62o (i ith Cir. 1984), aff'd, 471 U.S. 222 (1985)).
84 Hunter, 471 U.S. at 233 ("[W]e are confident that § 2 [of the Fourteenth Amendment]
was not designed to permit the purposeful racial discrimination attending the enactment and
operation of § 182 [of the Alabama Constitution] which otherwise violates § i of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Nothing in our opinion in Richardson v. Ramirez ... suggests the contrary.").
85 Price, supra note 18, at 382 ("Few lawsuits, however, have been successful in applying
the Hunter rule to similar statutes.. ..").
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criminal disenfranchisement laws on facts less compelling than those of
Hunter.16 Reviewing a Mississippi constitutional provision of "similar age
and intent" as the one invalidated in Hunter, the Fifth Circuit held that
a state can save a criminal disenfranchisement provision enacted with ra-
cially discriminatory intent by amending it in such a way as to remove the
taint.8 7 Here, the court was persuaded that amendments to the list of crimes
for which one can be disenfranchised-crimes previously excluded from
the list because they were not considered "black crimes"-rendered the
provision constitutional. 8 The Eleventh Circuit, reviewing Florida's crimi-
nal disenfranchisement provision, noted that while some lawmakers may
have had racially discriminatory intentions at the time the provision was
amended following the Civil War, two facts saved the provision: (1) criminal
disenfranchisement existed at the time of Florida's statehood; and (2) the
Florida Constitution was revised in 1968 to make the provision disenfran-
chise more individuals.8 9 The Fourth Circuit adopted similar grounds when
it upheld a Virginia disenfranchisement provision. 9° The court noted that
the Virginia provision has remained relatively unchanged and pre-dated
both the Civil War and the extension of the franchise to African Ameri-
cans.91 Therefore, the court reasoned, the provision's intent could not have
been to deny the franchise to African Americans when they were already
disenfranchised. Finally, the same court upheld Maryland's criminal disen-
franchisement provision because the record was devoid of evidence that
the statute was applied in a racially discriminatory manner.92 As such, there
was no equal protection argument.93
There is an equal protection avenue open to opponents of criminal
disenfranchisement statutes. However, proof requires a highly persuasive
argument that the provision was created for substantially racially discrimi-
natory reasons and that the result is a clear disparate impact on a suspect
class.' Given the case law, however, it seems that states can prevail on
equal protection grounds by amending their criminal disenfranchisement
provisions to remove the taint of discrimination, perhaps even if such an
amendment is disingenuous. Despite strong evidence that criminal disen-
franchisement laws disproportionately affect African Americans and other
racial and ethnic minorities, 9 a successful equal protection challenge re-
86 See, e.g., Cotton v. Fordice, 157 E3d 388, 391-92 (5th Cir. 1998).
87 See id.
88 See id. at 391.
89 SeeJohnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F3d 1214, 1220-21 (i ith Cir. 2004) (en banc).
9o See Howard v. Gilmore, 205 F3d 1333 (Va. 2000) (per curiam).
9i Id.
92 See Buckner v. Schaefer, 36 F3d 1o9 10994) (per curiam).
93 Id.
94 See, e.g., Hunter, 471 U.S. at 233.
95 See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
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quires discriminatory intent. Unless the record surrounding the adoption
of the provision in question demonstrates a desire to dilute or exclude the
franchise of a racial or ethnic class, a plaintiff bringing an equal protection
challenge to a criminal disenfranchisement law will almost certainly fail.
B. Eighth Amendment
The most obvious result of a criminal conviction is loss of liberty (i.e. incar-
ceration). It logically follows that such a loss of liberty necessarily includes
the loss of certain "rights." For example, once convicted and incarcerated,
an offender can no longer exercise the right to travel freely, the right to
dance on a sidewalk, and the right to go shopping. It seems reasonable that
a state may also prohibit other rights while incarcerated, including the right
to vote. However, many criminal disenfranchisement jurisdictions prohibit
the offender from voting after he or she is released from custody; in some
jurisdictions, this prohibition continues for life.96 Such a regime results in
criminal defendants who feel the effects of their conviction through dis-
enfranchisement long after the rest of their sentence is complete. Some
opponents of criminal disenfranchisement provisions maintain that such a
system constitutes a punishment that is unnecessarily "cruel or unusual" in
violation of the Eighth Amendment. 97
The first step in the Eighth Amendment inquiry is determining wheth-
er the challenged provision is actually a punishment as opposed to a mere
regulatory measure. 98 The Supreme Court has defined penal reactions to
crime as those that "impose[ ] a disability for the purposes of punishment.
. to reprimand the wrongdoer, to deter others, etc ... ."9 Such an outcome
is contrasted with non-penal provisions, which are those that "impose...
a disability, not to punish, but to accomplish some other legitimate gov-
ernmental purpose."'" To determine if a provision is penal or non-penal,
courts will look to the "evident purpose of the legislature," recognizing
that a provision may manifest both penal and non-penal characteristics.,1" A
court will proceed to an Eighth Amendment analysis only if it has satisfied
itself that the purpose of the provision under review is punishment.
Plaintiffs seeking to prove criminal disenfranchisement laws uncon-
stitutional as cruel and unusual punishment have been uniformly unsuc-
96 See supra notes 44-53 and accompanying text.
97 "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and un-
usual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
98 See generally Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977); Mark E. Thompson, Comment,
Don't Do the Crime If You Ever lntend to Vote Again: Challenging the Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons
as Cneland Unusual Punishment, 33 SETON HALL L. REv. 167 (2002).
99 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,96 (1958).
ioo Id.
io Id.
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cessful. In fact, courts have not reached the Eighth Amendment analysis
because they have asserted that criminal disenfranchisement provisions
are regulatory rather than penal in nature.10 Lower federal courts seem to
have drawn their support for this conclusion from a line in Trop v. Dulles,
a 1958 Supreme Court decision. To illustrate the application of his test for
determining whether a provision is regulation or punishment, Chief Jus-
tice Warren described a hypothetical bank robber who is incarcerated and
loses his right to vote: "[b]ut because the purpose of the latter statute [the
criminal disenfranchisement provision] is to designate a reasonable ground
of eligibility for voting, the law is sustained as a nonpenal exercise of the
power to regulate the franchise."103 In his opinion, Warren did not elaborate
further on this point or offer support as to why a criminal disenfranchise-
ment provision is not penal. Regardless, a number of lower federal courts
have cited this statement as precedent. The Second Circuit stated only
Chief Justice Warren's pronouncement and proceeded to summarily reject
an Eighth Amendment challenge to New York's criminal disenfranchise-
ment law."° Similarly, in evaluating Washington's criminal disenfranchise-
ment law, a federal trial court did not analyze whether the provision is regu-
lation or punishment but rather accepted as a truism that it is the latter.05
Another federal trial court actually examined the regulation versus punish-
ment argument and concluded that because of Georgia's strong interest
in regulating elections, its criminal disenfranchisement provision must be
regulatory in nature. 106 Finally, the California Supreme Court took a similar
approach in concluding that the state's criminal disenfranchisement provi-
sion-much like a prohibition on voting for minors and the mentally ill-is
merely a regulation intended to prevent those without the requisite capac-
ity from exercising the franchise." 7
Given the case law, it would seem that pursuing an Eighth Amendment
challenge to a criminal disenfranchisement statute would be ill-advised.
Unless the United States Supreme Court is prepared to overrule Trop, any
successful Eighth Amendment case must prove that criminal disenfran-
chisement provisions are penal in nature, which has yet to be done in the
federal courts. 08 In the plaintiff's favor, there is a large body of scholar-
ship that suggests retribution is the true policy justification behind these
provisions, and there is little, if any, evidence to indicate convicted crimi-
1o2 See Thompson, supra note 98, at 186-87 ("Courts have relied on Trop as precedent
for the proposition that disenfranchisement is not punishment.").
103 Trop, 356 U.S. at 96.
104 See Green v. Bd. of Elections, 380 E2d 445,449 (2d Cir. 1967).
1o5 See Farrakhan v. Locke, 987 E Supp. 1304,1314 (E.D. Wash. 1997), aff'dinpart, rzv'd
inpartsub nora. Farrakhan v. Washington, 338 F3d ioo9 (9th Cir. 2003).
io6 See Kronlund v. Honstein, 327 F. Supp. 71, 73-74 (N.D. Ga. 197I).
107 See Otsuka v. Hite, 414 P.2d 412,416-17 (Cal. 1966).
io8 See supra notes 102-07 and accompanying text.
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nals disrupt elections."° These facts will prove paramount to successfully
arguing that these laws are intended as punishment. Litigants, however,
should be aware that even overwhelming evidence to the contrary may be
no match for crafty legislators who declare an intent to "regulate elections"
within legislation or a criminal disenfranchisement-enabling constitution-
al provision ."I Finally, even after convincing a court to hear an Eighth
Amendment challenge on its merits, a successful plaintiff will have to argue
that criminal disenfranchisement provisions actually are cruel and unusual
punishment. The success of such a claim will depend on the length of the
disenfranchisement in question and available mechanisms for having one's
franchise restored. The United States Supreme Court has relied on "evolv-
ing standards of decency" that are the hallmark of "a maturing society" in
determining what is and what is not cruel and unusual punishment."' With
forty-eight states plus the District of Columbia having some sort of crimi-
nal disenfranchisement provision on the books,"' arguing that anything is
evolving is likely to be a hard sell.
C. Voting Rights Act of 1965
The legal theory summoned to the aid of criminal disenfranchisement
opponents most recently is section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965
("VRA'). 113 Section 2 was amended in 1982 to prohibit voting procedures
that have a racially discriminatory impact, as opposed to those that have a
racially discriminatory intent. 1 4 In this regard, there is statistical evidence
io9 See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text; see generally Thompson, supra note 98.
! IO However, most state constitutional provisions and statutes prescribing criminal dis-
enfranchisement do not declare a legislative purpose, but this information may be discerned
by digging into the legislative history. See Thompson, supra note 98, at 188. At least one state
constitution authorizes the legislature to enact statutes to protect the sanctity of the electoral
process. See N.M. CONsT. art. VII, § I ("The legislature shall enact such laws as will secure
the secrecy of the ballot, the purity of elections and guard against the abuse of elective fran-
chise."). Following this constitutional command, the New Mexico state legislature restored
the felons' voting rights upon completion of their sentences in 2oo . See N.M. STAT. § i-4-27.1
(zooi). Ostensibly, the state legislature concluded that continuing to disenfranchise felons
after they had completed their sentence was unnecessary to effectively regulate New Mexico
elections.
I I I Trop v. Dulles, 256 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). Recently, the Court utilized this test, in part,
to hold that the execution of mentally retarded individuals violates the Eighth Amendment.
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
112 See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 4, at 3.
113 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (zooo).
114 Compare City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (198o) (plurality opinion) (construing
the VRA before the 1982 amendment), with Taylor v. Haywood County, 544 F Supp. 1z2,
1134 (WD. Tenn. 1982) (construing the VRA after the 1982 amendment). The current form of
the VRA provides, in relevant part:
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard,
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in the literature to demonstrate that criminal disenfranchisement provi-
sions disproportionately affect minorities, particularly African Americans.' 5
However, claims under section 2 of the VRA have historically involved mi-
nority vote dilution by operation of the way in which governments design
voting districts, specifically at-large elections and multi-member districts.16
Buoyed by this historical application, some scholars and practitioners doubt
that section 2's prohibitions on voting regimes that have a racially discrimi-
natory impact extend to criminal disenfranchisement provisions. There are
records in the legislative history surrounding the passage of the original
VRA that indicate Congress did not intend the VRA to prohibit states from
enforcing criminal disenfranchisement laws.1' 7 These debates, however,
took place in 1965, when Congress may not have fully understood or dis-
cussed the gross racial disparity in voting rights caused by these laws.118
Due to ambiguity regarding Congress' intent to cover or exclude crimi-
nal disenfranchisement provisions from section 2 protection, the case law
is unresolved as to whether a challenge to a criminal disenfranchisement
provision can proceed on a VRA theory."9 The core of the disagreement is
one of federalism-namely, whether Congress, via the VRA, can legislate
voter qualifications, which is a power that has historically been left to the
practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or po-
litical subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement
of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of
race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section
1973b(f)(2) of this title, as provided in subsection (b) of this section. (b)
A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, based on the
totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading
to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not
equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected
by subsection (a) of this section in that its members have less opportu-
nity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political
process and to elect representatives of their choice.
42 U.S.C. § 1973 (zooo).
115 Seesupra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
116 See DANIEL HAYS LOWENSTEIN & RICHARD L. HASEN, ELECTION LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 188 (3d ed. 2004).
117 S. REP. No. 89-162 (1965), reprintedin 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 25o8, 2562 (providing the
joint view of Senators Dodd, Hart, Long, Kennedy, Bayh, Burdick, Tydings, Dirksen, Hruska,
Fong, Scott, and Javits) ("Subsection 4(c)(3).- The third type of test or device covered is any
requirement of good moral character. This definition would not result in the proscription of
the frequent requirement of States and political subdivisions that an applicant for voting or
registration for voting be free of conviction of a felony or mental disability. It applies where
lack of good moral character is defined in terms of conviction of lesser crimes.").
1 18 See generally supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
I19 See generally Lauren Handelsman, Note, Giving the Barking Dog a Bite: Challenging
Felon Disenfranchisement Under the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1875 (2005)
(examining the VRA challenges to criminal disenfranchisement laws).
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states.2 0 In five cases involving section 2 challenges to criminal disenfran-
chisement laws to come before the federal appellate courts, the Second and
Eleventh Circuits found that a VRA challenge could not proceed,' while
the Sixth and Ninth Circuits held otherwise.1 2 2 Despite the fact that the
federal appeals courts have reached two different conclusions on this point,
the Supreme Court denied certiorari in three of these cases.
2 3
In the first of two criminal disenfranchisement cases argued on a sec-
tion 2 theory to come before the Second Circuit, the court concluded that
"such an application would raise serious constitutional questions regarding
the scope of Congress' authority to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments."'24 The court noted that criminal disenfranchisement laws
existed throughout the country prior to the passage of the Civil WarAmend-
ments to the United States Constitution as proof that such laws are "not
an attempt to evade the requirements" of those amendments. 5 Addition-
ally, the court pointed out that, as courts have done with respect to equal
protection challenges to criminal disenfranchisement statutes,2 6 the very
language of section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment appears to authorize
states to bar criminals from exercising the franchise. 7 The court reasoned,
therefore, that a statute such as the VRA passed pursuant to the Fourteenth
Amendment cannot be used to invalidate a procedure expressly authorized
by the same amendment.
1 2 8
120 Id. at 1876.
121 See Johnson v. Governor of Fla. (Johnson If), 405 E3d 1214 (I ith Cir. 2005) (holding
that a VRA challenge cannot proceed on the merits), cer. deniedsub nom. Johnson v. Bush, 126
S.Ct. 650 (zoo5); Baker v. Pataki, 85 F3d 919 (2d Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (same). Another case
decided by a panel of the Second Circuit originally held that VRA challenge cannot proceed
on the merits. Muntaqim v. Coombe, 366 E3d 102 (2d Cir. 2004). The Supreme Court denied
a writ of certiorari in that case. Muntaqim v. Coombe, 543 U.S. 978 (2004). However, the
Second Circuit later agreed to rehear the case en banc and ultimately held that the plaintiff
prisoners were not citizens of New York and therefore lacked standing to bring the suit in
the first instance. See Muntaqim v. Coombe, 449 F3d 371 (2d Cir. 2oo6) (vacating the panel's
opinion).
122 See Farrakhan v. Washington, 338 E3d oo9 (9th Cir 2003) (holding that a VRA chal-
lenge can proceed on the merits), cert. deniedsub noma. Locke v. Farrakhan, 543 U.S. 984 (2004);
Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.zd 1255 (6th Cit. 1986) (same).
123 Bush, 126 S. Ct. at 650; Muntaqim, 543 U.S. at 978; Farrakhan, 543 U.S. at 984. The
petitions for certiorari in Farrakhan and Muntaqim specifically asked the Court to review the
decisions to resolve the circuit split as to whether a challenge to a criminal disenfranchisement
law can proceed on a VRA section 2 theory. The Court denied both petitions on November 8,
2004. See Handelsman, supra note i19, at 1877.
124 Baker, 85 F3 d. at 922 (Mohoney, J., concurring).
125 Id. at 928.
126 See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
127 See Baker, 85 F3d. at 929 (Mohoney, J., concurring).
128 Id. (citing with approval Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24,43 (1974)).
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The Second Circuit adopted and clarified the Muntaqim reasoning. 9
The court referred to a canon of judicial construction known as the "Clear
Statement Rule," which states that any Congressional intent to alter the
balance of state and federal authority must be made clearly and explic-
itly. 30 After examining the text of section 2 of the VRA and the legislative
history surrounding its adoption, the Second Circuit found no evidence
of such intent.13' Therefore, the Second Circuit concluded, a VRA chal-
lenge to criminal disenfranchisement laws cannot proceed to the merits. 3
Shortly after vacating its first decision-holding that a VRA challenge to
Florida's criminal disenfranchisement statute is permissible-the Elev-
enth Circuit changed its course on the same issue. 3 The court adopted the
Clear Statement Rule reasoning of Muntaqim, noting that the application of
the VRA to criminal disenfranchisement laws "raises grave constitutional
concerns."' 3" The court felt that the decision to disenfranchise criminals is
a matter of public policy, and "[flederal courts cannot question the wisdom
of this policy choice."'
' 35
Other courts have reached the merits of a VRA challenge to criminal
disenfranchisement laws. In a 1986 case, the Sixth Circuit did not discuss
whether the VRA applies to such laws and instead proceeded directly to a
discussion on the merits of the claim.136 Using a totality of the circumstanc-
es test, the court concluded that the Tennessee criminal disenfranchise-
ment statute did not result in minority vote dilution. 37 The court noted
the even-handed application of the law to all felons and concluded that
the law did not actually create fewer minority voters. 138 Rather, the court
reasoned that it is the individuals themselves-both minorities and non-
minorities-who have chosen to commit a proscribed act that triggered the
state's interference with their franchise. 13 9
As to the applicability of the VRA to criminal disenfranchisement laws,
the Ninth Circuit's decision in Farrakhan is more instructive. 1" The court
noted that "[flelon disenfranchisement is a voting qualification," and as
such, "Section 2 is clear that any voting qualification that denies citizens
i29 Muntaqim v. Coombe, 366 F3d 102, 1 15 (2d Cir. 2004).
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Johnson v. Governor of Fla. (Johnson 1), 353 E3d 1287 (1 Ith Cir. 2003), vacated 377
F3d i163 (1lth Cir. 2004).
134 Johnson v. Governor of Fla. (Johnson 11), 405 E3 d 1213, 1234 ( ith Cir. 2005).
135 Id. at 1235.
136 Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255, 1259-6o (6th Cir. 1986).
137 Id. at 126o-6i
138 Id. at 1262
139 Id. at 1262.
14o Farrakhan v. Washington, 338 F3d ioo9, ioi6 (9th Cir. 2003).
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the right to vote in a discriminatory manner, violates the VRA."'' Proceed-
ing to the merits, the Ninth Circuit noted that the plaintiffs' evidence of
racial discriminatory impact was "compelling" but remanded the case for a
totality of the circumstances inquiry, which the district court had failed to
conduct in the initial proceeding. 14 1 On remand, the trial court found that
although "[tihe Court has no doubt that members of racial minorities have
experienced discrimination in Washington's criminal justice system," the
plaintiffs failed to carry their burden of showing a discriminatory impact
under a totality of the circumstances analysis.' 43 Accordingly, the trial court
granted summary judgment for the defendants.'
The question as to whether the VRA applies to criminal disenfranchise-
ment provisions is a classic "spirit of the law" versus "letter of the law"
controversy. On the one hand, the language and intent of the VRA is to
prevent racial minorities from having their vote diluted. Criminal disen-
franchisement laws appear to violate this spirit, as statistical evidence indi-
cates these laws do bar a disproportionate percentage of minorities from ex-
ercising the franchise. 14 On the other hand, there is no explicit prohibition
against criminal disenfranchisement laws in the VRA, and section 2 of the
Fourteenth Amendment appears to implicitly approve the enactment of
such laws.' 46 Regardless, it is important to note that no criminal disenfran-
chisement statute has ever been invalidated using a VRA theory. 47 There-
fore, if the U.S. Supreme Court eventually sanctions the use of section 2 of
the VRA to review criminal disenfranchisement laws, it will be necessary
for plaintiffs to clearly and forcefully argue the racially discriminatory ef-
fect of such laws. A showing of areas with a high-criminal, low-voting popu-
lation would prove particularly useful in this regard. While some had hoped
Congress would amend the VRA to reach racially discriminatory criminal
disenfranchisement laws, those hopes were dashed when the 2006 VRA
reauthorization did not include such language."'
141 Id. (citing Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 233 (1985)).
142 Farrakhan, 338 F3d at IOZO.
143 Farrakhan v. Gregoire, No. CV-96-o76-RHW, 2oo6 WL 1889273, at *9 (E.D. Wash.
July 7, 2oo6).
I44 Id.
145 Seesupra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
146 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § z. Seegenerally supra note 74.
147 See Handelsman, supra note i 19, at 1876.
148 See Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of zoo6, Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577; see also
Charles Babington, Voting Rights Act Extension Passes in Senate, 98 to o, WASH. PosT, July 21,
2006, at A i.
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D. Political Change
The most successful challenges to criminal disenfranchisement laws in re-
cent years have taken place entirely outside the judicial arena. In several
states, opponents of criminal disenfranchisement have successfully lob-
bied state legislatures to make ex-felons eligible to vote. Some states, in-
cluding Tennessee in 1996,149 Texas in 1997, s0 and New Mexico in 2001,1s'
responded by restoring ex-felons' voting rights immediately upon comple-
tion of their sentence. Two other states, Delaware' and Nebraska,'-3 re-
cently enacted legislation to replace their lifetime felon voting ban with
a five-year and two-year post-sentence prohibition on voting respectively.
Maryland 5 4 and Nevada"5 s have also passed legislation in recent years in-
creasing ballot access for some ex-felons. A grassroots movement in Rhode
Island led to the passage of a constitutional amendment in 2006 that ex-
tended the franchise to probationers and parolees.5 6 Similarly, Connecti-
cut provided voting rights to criminals on probation in 2001.117 Finally,
149 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-29-105 (1996). In Tennessee, the individual must obtain
a judgment from a local trial court in order to restore her voting rights. Individuals convicted
of murder, rape, treason, or voter fraud are ineligible to have voting rights restored. Id. § 40-
29-105(c)(2)(B).
150 See Tx. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 11.002 (Vernon 1997).
151 See N.M. STAT. § 31-13-1 (2oO6).
152 See DEL. CONST. art. V, § 2. An amendment to the Delaware Constitution in 2000 pro-
vides for automatic restoration of felon voting rights after five years have elapsed. Convictions
for murder, sexual crimes, and "crimes against the public" are not eligible for automatic res-
toration. Id.
153 See NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-112 (2OO6). The Nebraska legislature initially passed
Legislative Bill 53 on March 3, 2005, however Governor Dave Heinemann vetoed it. The
legislature responded by overriding the veto by a vote of thirty-six to eleven. See Nate Jenkins,
Lawmakers Overide Felon Voting Veto, LINCOLN J. STAR (Lincoln, Neb.), Mar. 1I, 2005, at BI.
154 See MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAw § 3-102 (West 2oo6) (removing the lifetime ban on
voting for felons who are twice convicted of non-violent felonies three years after the comple-
tion of the individual's sentence).
155 See NEv. REV. STAT. § 213.157 (2oo6) (automatically restoring voting rights upon com-
pletion of the sentence for felons convicted of a first-time non-violent felony)
156 See R.I. CONsT. art. II, § I; see also OFFICE OF THE R.I. SEC'Y OF STATE, 2006 VOTER
INFORMATION HANDBOOK 6 (2OO6), available at http://www.sec.state.ri.us/elections/elections/
publications/referenda-guide-o6.pdf; Monica Davey, Liberals Find Rays of Hope on Ballot
Measures, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2006, at 16.
157 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-46a (2006).
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Kentucky,""8 Virginia, 1 9 and Wyoming' 16 have enacted disparate types of
legislation aimed at making it easier for ex-felons to regain their right to
vote. In the absence of legislative action, Iowa Governor Tom Vilsack an-
nounced a policy in 2005 to automatically restore ex-felons' voting rights
with a monthly executive order. 161
In addition to the panoply of states that have recently enacted legis-
lation affecting criminals' right to vote, a large number of states are cur-
rently considering such measures. 162 In 2005 alone, no fewer than fifty bills
were introduced in statehouses across the country impacting voting rights
for ex-felons.' 63 In Kentucky, three bills have been introduced in the 2007
General Assembly that would submit to voters an amendment to section
145 of the Kentucky Constitution permitting ex-felons to vote. 64 Criminal
158 See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 196.045 (West 2006) (directing the Kentucky Department of
Corrections to notify felons at the time of release from prison of the procedures for regaining
their voting rights).
159 VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-231.1 (2006) (requiring the Virginia Department of Corrections
to notify felons at the time of release from prison of the procedures for regaining their vot-
ing rights). Under a streamlined and simplified restoration process, Governor Mark Warner
restored voting rights to 3,414 ex-felons during his time in office. Christina Bellatoni, 3414
Felons' Rights Restored, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2oo6, at B i.
i6o See Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 7-13-105 (2006) (allowing first-time, non-violent ex-felons to
petition the Wyoming Parole Board for a restoration of voting rights five years after the com-
pletion of their sentence).
161 See Iowa Exec. Order No. 42, supra note 46.
162 In 2006, bills were introduced in at least twenty states that would enfranchise felons
or otherwise ameliorate barriers to voting for felons. TrendTrack, http://thomas.trendtrack.
com/texis/tt/search (query "felon voting") (last visited Mar. 25, zoo6).
163 See Electionline.org, Felony Voting Legislation, http://electionline.org/Default.
aspx?tabid=z91 (last visited Feb. 25, 2007).
164 See S.B. 15, 2007 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2007), available at http://www.lrc.
ky.gov/record/o7RS/SBI5.htm; H.B. 36, 2007 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2007), available
at http://www.lrc.ky.gov/record/07RS/HB36.htm; H.B. 70, 2007 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ky.
2007), available at http://www.lrc.ky.gov/record/o7RS/HB7o.htm. HB 70, which appears to
have the greatest chance of passage, is cosponsored by nineteen members of the Kentucky
House of Representatives. The measure would propose a constitutional amendment to voters
that would create an automatic restoration of voting rights upon the completion of a felon's
sentence. Individuals convicted of murder, sexual contact with a minor, rape, and sodomy
would not receive automatic voting rights restoration. Such individuals, however, could
reacquire voting rights through a gubernatorial pardon. See id. The bill passed the house
by a vote of seventy to twenty-eight, but its fate is uncertain in the senate. See id.; see also
Brandon Ortiz, Senator Upset His Amendment Cut-Mongiard: Republicans' Hypocrisy Exposed,
LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, Mar. 1, 2007, at D4; Sarah Vos, Amendment to Restore Vote to Felons
Advances-House OK's Measure for Most Offenses, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, Mar. 1, 2007, at
D4.
Similarly, three bills to amend section 145 to allow varying levels of ex-felon voting were
filed during the 2006 General Assembly. See S.B. 184, 2oo6 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2006),
available at http://www.lrc.ky.gov/record/o6RS/SB184.htm; H.B. 434, zoo6 Gen. Assem., Reg.
Sess. (Ky. zoo6), available at http:/lwww.lrc.ky.gov/record/o6RS/HB434.htm; H.B. 480, 2006
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disenfranchisement laws have come to the attention of Congress as well.
In 2005, Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton introduced the Make Every Vote
Count Act, which would allow ex-felons who have completed their terms of
incarceration, probation, and parole to vote in all federal elections notwith-
standing a state-mandated prohibition on voting in other elections. 1 65 Con-
gressman Charles Rangel has introduced similar legislation in the 110th
Congress. 166
The removal of barriers to criminal voting rights via legislation follows
no discernable geographic or ideological trend. The fact that states as dis-
similar as Connecticut, Nebraska, Texas, Virginia, and Wyoming have taken
steps to enfranchise criminals means that this issue is gaining exposure
throughout the country. If history is any indication, much of the pending
legislation will not be enacted into law; however, with each introduced bill,
the plight of disenfranchised criminals gains notoriety. Perhaps the recent
legislative response has been motivated by public officials who desire a
more inclusive democracy--one in which more individuals are allowed to
cast ballots for the representatives of their choice. Regardless of the effect
of benevolent intent, recent legislation surely has been driven in part by a
strong public consensus on the issue. 167 In 2002, a team of sociologists sur-
veyed 1,000 American adults and found that eighty percent favored voting
rights for ex-felons who have completed their terms of incarceration, pro-
bation, and parole. 161 In addition, the survey found that sixty-four percent
of respondents favored voting rights for probationers, and sixty percent
supported voting rights for parolees. 169 It is likely that lawmakers are hear-
ing-and responding to-the voices of many of these constituents.
Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2006), available at http://www.lrc.ky.gov/record/o6RS/IB48o.
htm. Despite having nineteen co-sponsors, HB 480 never received a hearing in committee.
Similarly, HB 434 was withdrawn by the sponsor, and SB 184 died in the State and Local
Government Committee.
As one of the three states to permanently prohibit ex-felons from voting, Kentucky's
disenfranchisement regime has received increasing attention. A League of Women Voters
report notes that one in every seventeen Kentucky adults-186,248 otherwise voting-eligible
individuals in all--cannot vote because of a felony conviction. Jack Brammer, League: Restore
Felons' Voting Rights, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, Nov. 3, 2006, at B7. The rate rises to one
in four among African Americans. See id. In fact, Kentucky has the highest African American
felony disenfranchisement rate in the country and is sixth-highest overall. See Editorial, Right
This Wrong-When Debt to Society is Paid, Let Felons Vote, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, Nov. 15,
2oo6, at A 12.
165 S. 450, io9th Cong. (2005). A companion bill was introduced by Representative
Stephanie Tubbs Jones in the House of Representatives. H.R. 939, 1o9th Cong. (2005). Both
bills died in committee.
166 H.R. 8i8, t ioth Cong. (2007).
167 Jeff Manza et al., Public Attitudes Towards Felon Disenfranchisement in the United States,
68 PuB. OPINION Q. 275, z8o (2004).
168 Id. at z8o-8I.
169 Id.
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Activist organizations and the media have joined the fight for equal
voting rights as well. The Sentencing Project operates a clearinghouse
for criminal disenfranchisement news and information from around the
country.7 Other advocacy groups such as the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People ("NAACP") Legal Defense Fund' and
the American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") Voting Rights Project"7
contribute financial and staff resources to assist with litigation involving
challenges to criminal disenfranchisement laws. Numerous local advocacy
groups have joined the campaign and have organized grassroots movements
throughout the country. 73 In addition, the media has joined those calling
for an end to ex-felon disenfranchisement regimes, as editorials and opin-
ion pieces to this effect have appeared in print throughout the country.174
E. Restoration
Restoration of civil rights, while neither a permanent solution to the plague
of criminal disenfranchisement laws nor a frontal attack on the laws them-
selves, is the most rapid and effective way felons are able to regain their
right to participate in the democratic process. Individuals who do not reside
in a jurisdiction that automatically restores criminals' voting rights and who
are unwilling or unable to launch a court battle to challenge the law that
disenfranchises them are left with one option: the restoration process. Pro-
cedures for having voting rights restored vary widely from state to state.17
In most states, the restoration process is difficult for ex-felons to navigate;
for the undereducated applicant without assistance, it is nearly impossi-
170 See The Sentencing Project, Felony Disenfranchisement, http://www.sentencingproject.
org/pubsoS.cfm (last visited Feb. 19, 2006).
171 See National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) Legal
Defense Fund, http://www.naacpldf.org (last visited Feb. 25, 2007).
172 American Civil Liberties Union, Voting Rights Project, http://www.aclu.org/votin-
grights/exoffenderslindex.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2007).
173 For example, Kentuckians for the Commonwealth is leading a grassroots movement
in Kentucky to amend the state's constitution to allow ex-felons to vote. See generally Restoration
of Voting Rights, KFTC CITIZENS LEGISLATIVE GUIDE (Kentuckians for the Commonwealth,
London, Ky.), Jan. 17. 2006, at 5
174 See, e.g., Editorial, Building Better Citizens, N.Y. DIMES, Oct. 28, 2oo6, at 14; Derrick
Z. Jackson, Op-Ed, Where Are Voting Rights for Ex-Felons, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 16, 2005, at
A15; Editorial, Nebraska in the Lead, N.Y. "DMES, Aug. 29, 2005, at A-14; Rebecca Perl, The Last
Disenfranchised Class, NATION, Nov. 24, 2003; Cindy Rodriguez, Op-Ed, Parolees Deserve the
Right to Vote, DENY. POST, Dec. 20, 2005, at F-oi; R. David Stengel, Return Voting Rights to
Ex-Felons-Voters are Less Likely to be Rearrested, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, Feb. 19, 2007,
at A I ; Commentary, Voting Rights for Ex-Felons, CHRISTItA SCi. MONITOR, Mar. 5, 2005, 8;
Editorial, Voting Rights for Ex-Felons, WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 2004, at A24; Adrienne Washington,
Op-Ed, Let All the People Feel the Power of the Their Vote, WASH. DMES, Oct. 21, 2004, at Bo2.
175 See EWALD, supra note 5, at 3-4-
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ble.'7 6 For example, Kentucky Governor Ernie Fletcher began requiring
restoration applicants to write an essay as part of their application, a feat
nearly impossible for a poorly educated ex-felon.1' Surveys of election of-
ficials in states with restoration procedures have discovered discrepancies
in the application of disenfranchisement statutes and process for approving
restoration petitions.'78 Perhaps more disturbing, many states employ elec-
tion officials who are unfamiliar with disenfranchisement and restoration
laws; in many cases, the officials provided incorrect information to those
involved in the study. 7 9 Finally, the administration of a restoration applica-
tion review process is expensive and inefficient. 80 This puts a significant
strain on state employees and budgets that are already overextended.
As automatic voting rights restoration laws have grown in popularity,
the number of states with restoration mechanisms has decreased. However,
those states that still require ex-felons to petition the government to be
re-enfranchised are in need of immediate reform. Officials must standard-
ize procedures throughout each state and make the application processes
as non-restrictive as possible. Antiquated, confusing, and arrogant restora-
tion practices only serve to exacerbate the dire condition of ex-felon voting
rights in this country, and therefore legislatures must fix them immedi-
ately.
IV. WHAT Now?
For a nation that considers itself one of the pinnacles of democracy in the
world, the United States does a poor job of guaranteeing fully participatory
elections. The 2000 presidential election shed light on just how non-dem-
ocratic many voting procedures are throughout the country. In response,
176 See id. at 7-8.
177 See Mark R. Chellgren, Pardon Advocates Take Advantage of Jobs Scandal, Ky. POST
(Covington, Ky.), Oct. 3, 2oo5, at Ki. The Fletcher Administration also began requiring the
applicant to provide three references and giving the local prosecutor veto power over the
application. Id. The decision to require applicants to write an essay is ironic and troubling
in light of Governor Fletcher's recognition that "6o percent of the prison population, and 90
percent of those on death row, can't read." Ernie Fletcher, Governor, Commonwealth of Ky.,
State of the Commonwealth Address (Jan. 13, 2004), available at http://governor.ky.gov/multi-
media/speeches/sotc_2oo4.htm. One wonders whether this practice qualifies as a literacy test,
which, of course, is prohibited by the Voting Rights Act. Notwithstanding the stringent new
restoration policy, Fletcher has restored the voting rights of 730 previously-disenfranchised
Kentucky citizens in nearly four years in office. See Jack Brammer, Panel Approves Limiting
Pardoning Powers-Restoration of Voting Rights for Felons Also OK'd, LEXINGTON HERALD-
LEADER, Feb. 14, 2007, at Ai. This figure, however, is dismal when compared to the total
number of applications received. See Editorial, Right This Wrong-When Debt to Society is Paid,
Let Felons Vote, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, Nov. 15, Zoo6, at A12.
178 See EWALD, supra note 5, at 8-9, 17.
179 See id. at 15-i6.
I8o Seeid. at 10-12.
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Congress enacted the Help America Vote Act, which provides standards
for voting procedures throughout the country and funding to ensure that
all voting age non-felons are able to participate in the electoral process.1",
It seems ironic that this country has made it a national priority to expand
ballot access to all individuals, no matter how politically uninformed they
may be, while demonstrating largely lukewarm interest in re-enfranchis-
ing a segment of the population that numbers into the millions. Moreover,
public officials struggle to create new strategies for "rehabilitating" ex-fel-
ons. It seems that a government that recognizes the value of every person's
citizenship through extension of voting rights has gone a long way toward
reintegrating ex-felons into life beyond the prison walls. As one disenfran-
chised ex-felon observed, "[w]hen the system disregards people, the peo-
ple disregard the system .*...", "
Given the mostly fruitless efforts to use the courts to overturn barriers
to ex-felon voting, opponents of the practice must turn their attention to
the political sector. The confluence of public opinion, advocacy networks,
and the media during the past decade appears to have produced a "perfect
storm" for opponents of criminal disenfranchisement laws. While litigants
seeking voting rights for ex-felons have generally fared poorly in the judi-
cial system, substantial progress is being made on the political front. This
disparity is undoubtedly due to the pervasive public discourse being gen-
erated on the topic. While those who view criminal disenfranchisement
laws as unconstitutional, illegal, or both may be disappointed by the nearly
uniform refusal of the courts to overturn these laws, those who are working
for criminal voting rights must realize that the fight is most likely to be won
in the political arena. The litigant challenging a criminal disenfranchise-
ment law in court is well-advised to abandon her costly litigation and focus
instead on lobbying elected officials for change.
With widespread public and media support and a number of enacted
legislative provisions to their credit, those in the criminal disenfranchise-
ment movement are in a position to score significant legislative victories.
And they must. Across the country, courthouses almost uniformly slam the
doors shut to criminals attempting to regain voting rights. Absent a dra-
matic, marked change in American jurisprudence on the issue, only the po-
litical arena remains for the vindication of criminals' voting rights. Whether
it is because they are anti-rehabilitative, unfair, racist, purposeless, anach-
ronistic, unconstitutional, or perhaps a combination of all these reasons,
criminal disenfranchisement laws are a hallmark of an era whose time has
passed. It is time to put these vestiges of a sad history to rest once and for
all.
I81 Help America Vote Act of 2ooi, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (zooz).
182 DVD: Democracy's Ghosts (ACLU 2005).
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